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ABSTRACT 
 
The last few years have been financially challenging for Scottish clubs: sustained losses, 
record levels of indebtedness, several clubs placed in administration. There are 
numerous reasons why Scottish football finds itself in this state. External factors like 
changes in the economics of football, in particular changes in football’s relationship 
with broadcasters have contributed; so too internal factors like poor financial 
management. While the need to adopt decision making and control procedures 
appropriate to the present financial circumstances of Scottish football is recognised, 
there is also a need for structural reform, both at a domestic and European level.  
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The last few years have been financially challenging for Scottish football clubs. The 
combined debt of the twelve Scottish Premier League (SPL) clubs at their 2003 year 
end was £186m, some £32m higher than the clubs’ combined annual turnover (PWC, 
2005). In the last four seasons only one SPL club has reported a pre-tax profit. At one 
point in season 2003/04 a quarter of SPL clubs were in administration (Morrow, 2004).  
The current structure of football in Scotland consists of the SPL and three divisions of 
the Scottish Football League (SFL), each with ten clubs. These 42 clubs differ markedly 
in terms of market size, attendance levels, facilities, playing skills etc. Many of the SFL 
clubs are part-time teams and attract very low attendances. But one common feature is 
that they are nearly all long lived institutions. Two thirds of the clubs were formed in 
the nineteenth century and despite the financial problems of many Scottish clubs in the 
last few years and before, one significant fact is that few clubs have actually gone out of 
business
1
. 
 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOOTBALL IN SCOTLAND 
 
While Scotland is part of Great Britain, and is governed by a British Parliament in 
London, in a football context the two countries have always operated independently, 
with separate leagues, separate national sides, and separate voices within UEFA and 
FIFA. Notwithstanding this independence it is indisputable that England and English 
football is and has been a major explanatory factor in the development and the current 
condition of Scottish football.  
 
The regularising of professional football in England in 1885 was a key driver of change 
in Scottish football as it removed the possibility of lucrative friendly matches against 
English clubs. The Scottish League was subsequently founded in 1890. Similar to 
 4 
England, for the most part Scottish football clubs adopted the structure of limited 
liability companies (Vamplew, 1988), motivated initially by a desire to protect the 
founders and officers of the club from personal liability in the event of the club 
developing unpayable debts, particularly as wages rose. Normally the limited liability 
model results in a separation of ownership and control of the company, but in football 
the two often continued to overlap with many Scottish clubs being owned by small 
groups of businessmen and a few hundred small shareholders, mostly fans. To this day 
most Scottish clubs remain structured as private limited companies. In effect the 
adoption of limited liability structure resulted in a division being created between those 
who owned and ran the clubs and those who supported them. Certainly, there has been a 
broadening of ownership at a number of clubs in recent years both by design - for 
example, through share issues at a club like Celtic - and by compulsion - for example, 
where clubs in financial crisis have been forced to seek new shareholders. Nevertheless, 
most Scottish clubs remain undercapitalised, have highly concentrated ownership 
structures and have restrictions on the transferability of shares; facts which serve to 
restrict the development of these clubs.   
 
On the playing side until the last decade or so it was common for top Scottish players to 
play for English clubs, their presence being an influential factor in interest in English 
football in Scotland. Another factor was television: long before satellite television and 
deregulation of the televised football market allowed armchair supporters in Scotland 
the opportunity to watch English FA Premiership matches live in their own home, 
highlights of English football were available on terrestrial television in Scotland on 
Saturday nights. 
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The Scottish Football Association (SFA) is the governing body for football in Scotland, 
with the professional leagues being administered by the SPL and the SFL. Teams from 
the SFL Division 1 can be promoted to the SPL as long as they meet certain criteria; for 
example, having a 6,000 capacity all-seater, covered stadium. The Premier League was 
set up in 1975/76 initially under the auspices of the SFL, but a new SPL, separate from 
the SFL, was established in season 1998/99. The new league was modelled on the 
highly successful English FA Premiership, the motivation being to increase the financial 
rewards available to top clubs particularly through improved television deals. Portrayed 
at its inception by the clubs as a bright new future for football in Scotland, many 
observers were less convinced, considering it more a case of plus ça change, plus c’est 
la meme chose: the same clubs, the same competitive imbalance, the same dominance 
by two clubs, Celtic and Rangers. 
 
Understanding Scottish football means appreciating the significance of Celtic and 
Rangers, the so-called ‘Old Firm’. Since the old Scottish League was set up in season 
1890/91 – when the  title was shared by Dumbarton and Rangers - on only 18 occasions 
out of a possible 108 has a club other than Celtic or Rangers been crowned champion, 
earning it the position as the most dominated domestic league in Western Europe 
(Gerrard, 2004). The dominance of these two clubs is also apparent financially. Their 
home match attendances are among the highest in Europe: for season 2003-2004, 
Celtic's average attendance was 58,500; at Rangers it was 49,250. By way of contrast, 
the average attendance for SPL clubs excluding the Old Firm is approximately 8,000. 
Taken together with the facts that since 1981 Scottish clubs have been permitted to 
retain gate receipts from their home matches (Crampsey, 1986) and that television rights 
for Scottish football are relatively low (see Table 1), the distribution of income set out 
in Figure 1 is easily understood.  
 6 
 
Time period Broadcasters Details Annual rights fee  
£m (approx) 
2004-2008 Setanta Live SPL matches 9.0 
2002-2004 BBC Live SPL matches, highlights 8.5 
1998-2002 BSkyB, BBC Live SPL matches, highlights 12.0 
1994-1998 BSkyB, BBC, STV Live SPL matches, highlights 4.0 
 
Table 1:  SPL television deals  
SOURCE: Morrow (2003), various press reports 
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Figure 1: Scottish Premier League clubs - average turnover 
 
WAGE DETERMINATION 
 
While the decisions taken in 2001 that resulted in the SPL not renewing its broadcasting 
deal with Sky Television and ending up with a shorter and less lucrative deal with the 
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BBC was a contributory factor (see Table 1), the principal explanation for the lack of 
profitability and the level of debt within the SPL has been the high level of wage costs 
(PWC, 2005). Notwithstanding that the Bosman ruling and subsequent modifications to 
the player transfer system have acted to drive up wages by creating something akin to a 
single European market in players (Morris et al. 2003), the figures in Table 2 indicate 
that directors at too many clubs have shown a disregard for financial common sense; 
offering contractual terms which could not be afforded in the medium to long term.  
 
 Total wages 
£000s 
Wages as a percentage of turnover 
 2003 2003 2002 2001 2000 
Aberdeen 5,431 77% 70% 86% 84% 
Celtic 33,079 55% 58% 62% 52% 
Dundee 4,122 104% 154% 126% 75% 
Dundee United 3,292 107% 88% 96% 81% 
Dunfermline Ath. 4,619 115% 132% 131% 137% 
Heart of Midlothian 5,116 85% 94% 90% 84% 
Hibernian 3,978 72% 78% 76% 78% 
Kilmarnock 4,282 79% 89% 76% 70% 
Livingston 4,099 84% 84% 72% NA 
Motherwell 2,241 71% 62% 107% 99% 
Rangers 34,592 71% 83% 70% 66% 
 
Table 2:  SPL player wage costs  
SOURCE:  company accounts, PWC (2005, 2002) 
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The consequence of this level of over-spending on wages and salaries has been 
sustained losses. More than half of the SPL clubs were technically insolvent (liabilities 
greater than their assets) at their 2003 year ends. While a few clubs, most noticeably 
Celtic as well as Heart of Midlothian, have used the Stock Exchange as a source of 
capital, the majority of Scottish clubs continue to have very concentrated ownership 
structures, with a majority of shares being owned either by a dominant owner of by the 
board of directors (Morrow, 1999). The key funders of Scottish football and of Scottish 
football’s losses have been and remain the banks and individual businessmen. 
 
Capital injections and changes in ownership have improved the financial position at 
individual clubs since the 2003 year end, most notably at Rangers and Heart of 
Midlothian plc. But these examples do not alter the underlying financial position or 
outlook for Scottish football. As Table 2 demonstrates the fundamental problem is a 
cost base which is out of line with income. Prudent financial management, coupled with 
the introduction of the UEFA club licensing system may help clubs to stabilise the 
position. But that alone will not solve the problems – within the current structure of 
football in Europe it is extremely difficult to see to see how most SPL clubs can trade 
out of these losses. More fundamentally, one risk of focusing only on internal issues of 
management and control is that Scottish football ends up in a state of ‘genteel and stable 
poverty’ (Royal Commission on Gambling, 1978), but entirely lacking in ambition. 
 
TIME FOR CHANGE? 
 
Scottish football may not be in crisis but equally its clubs and its structures face a 
number of major challenges, a fact recognised by the Scottish Parliament Enterprise and 
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Culture Committee (2005, para. 16) in its recent interim report and discussion paper on 
reforming Scottish football.  
 
Figures showing the extent of the challenge facing Scottish football are stark. … Just 
how long [the level of debt] can be sustained through the goodwill of clubs’ creditors 
is a moot point. 
 
In the short term what is essential is that all stakeholders behave in a manner 
appropriate to Scottish football’s changed financial circumstances. In particular there is 
a need for realism in the wages offered to, and demanded by, players. Improved 
financial management within clubs is also essential and in this regard the introduction of 
the UEFA club licensing system is a positive development. Longer term, it is about 
recognising the need for change. Key to this is dialogue involving all of football’s 
stakeholders. In this regard the consultation exercise initiated by the Scottish Parliament 
is a very positive development (Scottish Parliament Enterprise and Culture Committee, 
2005). At a domestic level this debate needs to focus on initiatives like restructuring - 
can a country of only 5m people continue to justify having 42 professional clubs, 
however much some of these clubs are professional in name only - ground sharing, 
relocation, ownership and governance of clubs and so on. But the debate also needs to 
extend beyond Scotland to consider issues like Europe-wide league restructuring, 
including cross-border initiatives like the Atlantic League and clubs playing in leagues 
organised other than under the auspices of their home association. From a narrow 
Scottish perspective, arguably the most important issue is solving the problem of Old 
Firm dominance, both for the benefit of Celtic and Rangers and for the benefit of the 
other Scottish clubs.  
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1
 Two exceptions are Airdrieonians F.C. and Clydebank FC. Formed in 1878, 
Airdrieonians went into liquidation at the end of season 2001/02 and as a result, 
the club ceased to be members of The Scottish Football League with effect from 9th 
May, 2002. Clydebank was a much younger club, becoming members of the SFL in 
season 1966/67. The club was placed into administration in December 2000. This 
followed the sale of its ground and its inability to find another suitable site. In an 
ironical link, in June 2002 the administrators of Clydebank accepted a bid from a 
consortium on condition that the club was permitted to relocate to Airdrie and 
change its name to Airdrie United. The SFL’s League Management Committee 
granted permission to enable Clydebank Football Club to change its name to Airdrie 
United and relocate to play its home matches at the Excelsior Stadium, the former 
home of Airdrieonians Football Club. 
